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Benjamin M. Leff
Over a year ago (March 7, 2015), a little store called the Cannabis
Corner opened in the small town of North Bonneville, Washington. The
Cannabis Corner is the first marijuana store operated by a "public
development authority," an independent entity created by a state or local
government. Public development authorities are generally exempt from
federal income taxes under section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code. For
a marijuanabusiness, this exemption is especially valuable because section
280E of the Code currently prevents marijuanabusinesses from deducting
many of the ordinary expenses other businesses regularly deduct, resulting
in extremely high federal income taxes.
This Article is the first to address whether independent governmental
affiliates that sell marijuana are exempt from federal income tax under
section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code. It argues that such entities
should easily pass the IRS's current interpretation of the three
requirementsfor tax-exemption under section 115: (i) that exempt income
be derived from "the exercise of any essential governmental function"; (ii)
that such income "accru[e] to a State or any political subdivision thereof";
and (iii) that the income "not serve private interests[.]" In addition, this
Article argues that though selling marijuanais illegal under federal law,
thatfact is not a bar to exemption under section 115 of the Code the way it
is under section 501 (c) (3).
Tax exemption for public development authorities that sell marijuanais
important because of the non-tax benefits of a marijuana market
dominated by government sellers. This Article explores the benefits that
might accrue if a state chose to create a regulatory regime for legalizing
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marijuanain which all marijuanaselling took place in government-owned
stores. The question of whether an independent governmental affiliate is
exempt from federal income tax, including section 280E, is especially
important to governments contemplating the contours of their legal
marijuanamarkets.
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INTRODUCTION

Over a year ago (March 7, 2015), a little store called the Cannabis
Corner opened up in the small town of North Bonneville, Washington,
about an hour by car from Portland, Oregon.' If you're trying to keep
track of the crazy world of federal taxation of marijuana businesses,
this little store might interest you, even if you live three thousand miles
away, as I do. To my knowledge, it is the first marijuana store to be
operated by a "public development authority." 2 A public development
authority is an independent entity created by a state or local
government. For me, Cannabis Corner's operation by a public
development authority is interesting because it means that the business
does not have to pay federal income tax on any of its profits. In the
marijuana industry, avoiding federal income tax is especially desirable
because section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code prevents traffickers
of schedule I controlled substances from deducting many of their
ordinary and necessary business expenses,3 and marijuana is still1 a
schedule I controlled substance.5 Therefore, marijuana stores' federal
income taxes are likely to be especially high. 6 The Cannabis Corner has
solved the federal income tax problem faced by other marijuana sellers.
I See, e.g., Todd C. Frankel, Cornering the Pot Market: After Washington State
Made It Legal, a Struggling Town Went into Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2015, at Al;
Evan Bush, Here's a First: Tiny Town Will Open Its Own Pot Shop, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar.
5, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/heres-a-first-tiny-townwill-open-its-own-pot-shop/; Dan Springer, First Government-Owned Pot Store Opens in
Washington State, Fox NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/
03/18/washington-state-pot-store-brings-revenue-to-local-town.html.
2 In Washington, Public Development Authorities are authorized under RCW
35.21.730. See generally Jay Reich, Stacey Cranshaw-Lewis & Deanna Gregory, Public
Development Authorities, MRSC, http://mrsc.org/getmedia/FO265D7F-F235-4254B1D1-BED2839DEE8B/PDA-IB516.aspx.
3 See generally Edward J. Roche, Jr., FederalIncome Taxation of Medical Marijuana
Businesses, 66 TAX LAw. 429 (2013).
4 On August 11, 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration, which has the
authority to re-schedule marijuana, declined to re-schedule it, "reaffirming its
conclusion that the drug's therapeutic value has not been proved scientifically and
defying a growing clamor to legalize it for the treatment of a variety of conditions."
Lenny Bernstein, U.S. Affirms Its Prohibition on Medical Marijuana, Wash. Post (Aug.
11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.coml/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/08/10/u-saffirms-its-prohibition-on-medical-marijuana/.
5 Marijuana's schedule I status means that it is a violation of federal criminal law
to sell it. Unfortunately, the fact that the Cannabis Corner is operated by a

governmental affiliate, exempt under section 115 of the Code, does nothing to absolve
its employees from federal criminal liability.
6 See, e.g., MarijuanaBusiness Conference Wrapup: 36 Tips, Lessons & Takeaways
for the Cannabis Industry, MED. MARIJUANA Bus. DAILY (Nov. 15, 2012),
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In 2014, I published an article in the Iowa Law Review that argued
marijuana sellers could solve their federal tax problem by organizing
and operating as nonprofit social welfare organizations, exempt from
federal income tax under section 501(c)(4). 7 A number of my
colleagues (and presumably the IRS) were unconvinced by my
argument that social welfare organizations could run a commercial
operation in violation of federal law without disqualifying themselves
for tax exemption. 8 The case for governmental affiliates, like the
public development authority that operates the Cannabis Corner, is
much stronger than the case I made for social welfare organizations. 9
Such government-owned entities are exempt from tax under section
115 of the Code rather than one of the subsections of 501(c). While
there is pathetically little binding authority on the matter, it appears
that marijuana stores could meet the requirements of section 115 in
exactly the same way that state-owned liquor stores do.lo Under

http://mjbizdaily.com/marijuana-business-conference-wrapup-36-tips-lessons-takeaways-for-the-cannabis-industry/ ("The federal tax situation is the biggest threat to
[state-sanctioned marijuana] businesses and could push the entire industry
underground.").
7 Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planningfor MarijuanaDealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. 523,
527 (2014) [hereinafter Tax Planning].
8 See Philip T. Hackney, A Response to Professor Leffs Tax Planning 'Olive Branch'
for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 25, 26 (2014). For a discussion of the
IRS's view that an organization that engages in illegal activity cannot qualify as exempt
under section 501(c)(4), see Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7, at 552-53; see also I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (Aug. 16, 2013) (holding that an organization that
facilitates the sale of marijuana is not exempt because "similar to other exemptions
and deductions, if a § 501(c)(16) organization commits illegal actions, or encourages
others to commit illegal actions, while performing its activities, it will not receive
Congress''legislative grace' of exemption from federal income tax").
9 Philip Hackney, in his critical response to my article, suggested, "in the spirit
of . .. offering a solution," that "the better course of action might be for the state or
local government to take that activity [selling marijuana] on itself." Hackney, supra
note 8, at 35. He argued that state-run marijuana dispensaries would be preferable to
private nonprofits because "State and local governments are exempt from tax in most
circumstances, and the state can provide more accountability to its community, the
federal government, and other states." Id.
10 Ellen P. Aprill, The Integral, the Essential and the Instrumental: Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Governmental Affiliates, 23 J. CORP. L. 803, 816 (1997) [hereinafter
The Integral] (according to the IRS's "astonishingly liberal" interpretation, "[f]or
purposes of section 115, anything that makes or saves the political subdivisions
money serves an essential governmental function"); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding
the Income of State and Local Governments: The Need for CongressionalAction, 26 GA. L.
REv. 421, 429 (1992) [hereinafter Excluding the Income] ("The IRS ... has taken the
concept of 'essential governmental function' and expanded it until it encompasses any
activity that makes or saves money for a state or local government.").
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section 115, income is exempt if it is "derived from ... the exercise of
any essential governmental function" and is "accruing to a State or any
political subdivision thereof[.]"" According to the IRS, it also must
not serve "private interests such as designated individuals,
shareholders of organizations, or persons controlled, directly or
indirectly, by such private interests."1 2 While it seems counterintuitive to say that selling marijuana is an "essential governmental
function," it appears that under current IRS practice, a governmentowned marijuana seller could well satisfy all three of the requirements
of section 115.
Perhaps more importantly for a marijuana store, there is absolutely
no guidance suggesting that the so-called "illegality doctrine" or
"public policy doctrine" - which is the impediment to a 501(c)(3)
organization (or as some argue, a 501(c)(4) organization) operating a
marijuana store - would apply to government affiliates. Indeed, it
would be extremely surprising if a court applied such a doctrine to
what is effectively state action. In my article of last year, I argued that
the federal government should defer to a local community about what
advances the community's social welfare. But, when a community's
government creates its own entity to advance its local interests (even if
the entity violates federal law), the case for inter-jurisdictional
deference from the federal government is even stronger.
But, the case for government-owned marijuana stores is not only
stronger because the legal case for federal tax exemption of such
entities is stronger. In my last article, I made a fairly weak argument
that social welfare organizations running marijuana stores could at
least start to redress the harm done to some communities by
marijuana prohibition. 3 Government-owned marijuana stores have
the potential to do a substantially better job at meeting these policy
goals than non-profit marijuana stores.1 4 First, cautious proponents of
marijuana legalization argue that some states might want to
experiment with a legalization regime in which all marijuana-selling
takes place in government-owned stores.1 5 This government-

11 I.R.C. § 115(1) (2012).
12 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (1988).
13 See Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7, at 559-62, 566-68.
14 For simplicity's sake, I refer to entities that participate in legal marijuana
markets as "stores" or "sellers," although there might be reasons for governmental
affiliates to participate in marijuana markets in other capacities, like as producers or
distributors. The arguments made in this Article may well apply to entities engaged in
other aspects of the marijuana industry.
15

See,

e.g., JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND CORP., CONSIDERING MARIJUANA
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monopoly system has numerous public health benefits, since it
enables the government to more easily monitor and control the retail
marijuana market, as well as directly control the marketing and
advertising of marijuana products. For years, many states have
experimented with state control of liquor sales, but there are reasons
to believe that marijuana may be significantly more suited to a statecontrolled market than alcohol, at least for a transitional period. 16 In
addition, direct state ownership of the marijuana market also solves
the potentially intractable problem of how to tax marijuana at the state
level.17 Finally, a state may want to create a state monopoly on
marijuana sales, at least initially, to avoid problems associated with
providing licenses to a small number of commercial sellers. Recently,
voters in Ohio rejected a marijuana legalization initiative at least
partially because even legalization activists thought the initiative
unfairly benefited a small number of commercial marijuana producers
(the same ones who had funded the initiative).1 8 Perhaps counterintuitively, one of the significant benefits of a true state monopoly is
that it avoids the evils of a state-created partial commercial
monopoly.' 9 These benefits of state ownership could be enjoyed
equally by governments who choose to sell marijuana through
independent affiliates, like public development authorities. Thus, the
question of whether an independent governmental affiliate is exempt
from federal income tax, including section 280E, is especially
important to governments contemplating the contours of their legal
marijuana markets.
This Article is the first to address whether independent
governmental affiliates that sell marijuana are exempt from federal
income tax under section 115 of the Internal Revenue Code. In
Section 1, I discuss the three legal requirements for tax exemption
under section 115, and how these requirements are likely to apply to a
public development authority like the Cannabis Corner. 20 In Section
II, I discuss whether a governmental affiliate selling marijuana might

LEGALIZATION:

INSIGHTS

FOR VERMONT

AND

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

60-63

(2015)

[hereinafter RAND REPORT], http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research
reports/RR800/RR864/RANDRR864.pdf; Rosalie Liccardo Pacula et al., Developing
Public Health Regulations for Marijuana:Lessons from Alcohol and Tobacco, 104 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1021, 1023 (2014).
16 See infra text accompanying note 128.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 113-18.
18 See infra text accompanying note 121.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 121 & 122.
20 See infra Part I.
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be denied tax-exempt status even if it meets all the section 115
requirements under the so-called "public policy" or "illegality"
doctrine. 21 In both of these sections, I argue that it should be relatively
easy for a public development authority or other governmental affiliate
to sell marijuana exempt from federal taxes. In the final section, I
discuss the benefits of recognizing federal tax exemption for
governmental affiliates that sell marijuana. 22 In this Article, I am not
trying to argue that the current situation - in which marijuana is
illegal under federal law and yet subject to a draconian federal tax
is a better system than if the President, or Congress, were to simply
de-schedule marijuana, making it legal under federal law and not
subject to section 280E. 23 But I am trying to point out that the current
tax system, including section 280E coupled with exemption for
governmental affiliates under section 115, has the possible benefit of
incentivizing governmental sales of marijuana over a purely
commercial model.
1.

TAX EXEMPTION OF A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY UNDER SECTION
115 OF THE CODE

Tax exemption for governments and governmental entities is
notoriously complicated. States and their political subdivisions are
exempt from tax either because of the Constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity or because of an implied statutory
immunity. 24 Entities that are an "integral part" of a state, or political
subdivision of a state, are also exempt under the same principles.25
However, entities that are created by a government but are too
independent to qualify as an "integral part" may also produce exempt
income, not because of implied immunity, but because of section 115

21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part Ill.
23 Under 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012), the Attorney General has the authority to
remove ("deschedule") any substance from the controlled substances schedules, after
an analysis by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In 2016, the Drug
Enforcement Agency considered re-scheduling marijuana, but ultimately declined to
do so. See supra note 4.
24 Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 421; Aprill, The Integral, supra
note 10, at 804-05 (noting that states and their political subdivisions are exempt from
federal income tax because "of an implied statutory immunity. That is, states and their
political subsidiaries are exempt because no provision of the Internal Revenue Code
taxes them as such.").
25 Aprill, The Integral, supra note 10, at 804, 810-14.
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of the Code. 26 Section 115 exempts from federal tax "income derived
from any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental
function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof, or
the District of Columbia." 27 Entities created by or affiliated with state
governments may also be exempt under sections 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4),
or, in rare occasions, some other subparagraph of section 501(c). As
Ellen P. Aprill puts it, "These five categories - political subdivision,
integral part of a state or political subdivision, section 115 entity,
form a
instrumentality, and section 501(c) organization complicated patchwork." 28
In the marijuana context, the difference between state entities that
are "integral" and those that are "independent" may be important for
non-tax reasons. For example, in a recent report commissioned by the
Vermont Secretary of Administration on regulatory possibilities should
Vermont legalize marijuana, the authors state, "we want to stress at
the outset that direct state participation in the supply chain could
cause the state to violate federal law." 29 To avoid the direct interjurisdictional clash that would be created if "[flederal agents could
enter state monopoly stores and arrest state employees," the authors
propose what they call "near monopoly." In a near monopoly, the
marijuana supply chain is controlled not by a government directly, but
by "a single, special-purpose entity, call it a public authority" that
would operate marijuana stores. 30 The reason an independent public
authority is preferable to direct control by a government is that, "in
substance, [it] might prove no more offensive to federal interests than
26 I.R.C. § 115 (2012).
27

Id. § 115(1).

28 Aprill, The Integral, supra note 10, at 805.
29 RAND REPORT, supra note 15, at 61 (citing Robert Mikos). The authors also point
out, "We say 'seem' because legal considerations concerning federalism are

complicated, and courts can surprise." Id. The report further points out that this
presumptive prohibition on direct state action with regard to marijuana creates what
they call "the American federalism dilemma" under which, "[a] state monopoly is the
worst option with respect to compliance with [federal criminal law]. . . . Federal
agents could enter state monopoly stores and arrest state employees carrying out the
option that has - arguably - the best chance to protect public health and reduce
harms associated with prohibition (state monopoly)." Id. at 72. See also ROBERT J.
MACCOUN ET AL., STANFORD LAW SCH. LAW & POL'Y LAB, LEGALIZING MARIJUANA IN
CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 14 (2015), https://law.stanford.edu/
publications/legalizing-marijuana-in-california-a-review-of-policy-considerations/
(citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin, Cooperative
Federalism and MarijuanaRegulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 106 (2015)); Pacula et al.,
supra note 15, at 1023.
30 RAND REPORT, supra note 15, at 63.
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a state's actions in a for-profit commercial model . . . ."31 It would still
be possible for the public authority's employees to be arrested by
federal agents for selling marijuana, but at least they wouldn't be state
employees, and so the state would only be indirectly responsible for
this cost of the inter-jurisdictional clash.
The Report goes on to observe that one disadvantage of an
independent public authority is that, unlike a government, it is
potentially subject to federal income tax on its "perhaps-significant
profits." 32 Section 115 provides that the income of an independent
government affiliate is exempt from federal tax only if it is "derived
from... the exercise of any essential government function[.]"33 The
authors of the Report conclude that a public authority selling marijuana
could not qualify for tax exemption under section 115 because "[it
might be hard to argue that selling marijuana is the 'exercise of [an]
essential governmental function,' so income of any public authority,
unlike income of a state monopoly, would bear federal income tax[. "34
This conclusion has strong intuitive appeal, since common sense tells us
that selling marijuana is not an essential government function. 35
However, it appears that common sense misleads in this case because
the conclusion comes from a too-literal reading of section 115.36 The
following section discusses section 115's application to an independent
governmental authority that sells marijuana.
A.

Essential Government Function

The question of what constitutes an essential governmental function
in the context of Section 115 has a long history, well told by Professor
Ellen P. Aprill almost twenty-five years ago.37 As Aprill points out, the
essential government function requirement found in section 115
"reflects an early stage of development in the constitutional doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity."3 8 At the time the provision was
31

Id.

Id. at 64.
33 I.R.C. § 115(1) (2012).
34 RAND REPORT, supra note 15, at 64.
35 See Bush, supra note 1 (quoting Skamania County Oregon Sheriff Dave Brown
as saying, "I don't think government should be in the business of selling marijuana . .
32

It's not a fundamental function of government").
36 The Author would like to thank Pat Oglesby for initially pointing out this issue.
(Email correspondence on file with the author).
37 See Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 423; Aprill, The Integral, supra
note 10, at 817.
38 Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 423.
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enacted in 1913, the Supreme Court had held that a federal tax on the
sale of liquor did not exempt sellers merely because they acted as
agents for a State because "whenever a state engages in a business
which is of a private nature, that business is not withdrawn from the
taxing power of the nation."3 9 In other words, states' income is only
exempt from federal tax when it comes from the states' sovereign
function (such as through taxation) and not when it comes from
commercial activities, like liquor sales, even if the purpose of the state
monopoly on liquor is to protect the public.
However, this distinction was later abandoned as unworkable by the
Supreme Court, which stated, "we reject limitations upon the taxing
power of Congress derived from such untenable criteria as
[g]overnment or
'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of . .
0
By abandoning the
activities conducted merely for profit[.]"
distinction between proprietary and governmental, the Supreme Court
left the "essential government function" test as a sort of orphan of an
archaic legal doctrine.
The fact that the Supreme Court has failed to identify those
functions of government that are "essential" in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity does not mean that the requirement has
been removed from the Code, however. Aprill believes that the
"essential governmental function" requirement in section 115 is
merely Congress's attempt to codify the distinction between
"proprietary" and "sovereign" functions of government described in
the old Supreme Court cases.41 Section 115(1) still says that income is
exempt only if it arises from an essential governmental function. So,
for example, in 1974 the Tax Court found that a state university was
not exempt under section 115 for the gain derived from the
liquidation of a corporation that owned hospitals.4 2 It applied the old
Supreme Court cases distinguishing between proprietary and
sovereign functions of government without any mention of the
Supreme Court's later disavowal of this approach.4 3 In 1979, the Ninth
39 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905).
40 See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946); see also Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) ("We therefore now reject,
as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' Any such rule leads to inconsistent
results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance[.]").
41 See Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 425-26 (citing Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. at 437).
42 Troy State Univ. v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 493, 503 (1974).
43 See id. at 502 (citing South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. at 463, and
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Circuit managed to avoid the problem entirely by holding that a statecreated alcohol seller was not exempt under section 115 because its
income did not accrue to the State, which "obviates resolution of" the
essential governmental function issue.44 In 1994, the Sixth Circuit
held that a "quasi corporation" of the State of Michigan was an
"integral part" of the state and therefore was tax exempt,4 5 but a wellreasoned dissent argued that the entity did not qualify as an "integral
part" and therefore could only be exempt if it satisfied the criteria of
section 115.46 The dissent went on to conclude that the entity at issue
did not so qualify because it provided "a quintessentially private
function," giving life (albeit in dissent) to the distinction between
proprietary and sovereign functions described in the old Supreme
Court cases.47
The IRS, however, has apparently taken a different approach than
the few courts that have applied the law. In 1935, the IRS issued a
General Counsel Memorandum that explained its reasoning for
exempting from tax the income of Montana's Liquor Control Board. 48
In its analysis, the IRS treated the Liquor Control Board as if it were
the State itself. It argued that income of a State is exempt, not because
of the precursor to section 115, but because the Revenue Act only
imposes tax on individuals and corporations, and not on States.49
Here, it implicitly distinguished Supreme Court cases like South
Carolinav. U.S., since that case involved a liquor excise tax rather than
an income tax. In explaining why a State is exempt from income tax
when it earns income directly, the memorandum states,
It is suggested that Congress, in not taxing the income of
States, may well have been motivated by a desire not to limit
the activities in which States might otherwise engage. The line
between those revenue-producing activities of a State which
are 'governmental' and those which are 'proprietary' is one
which is in its nature difficult to draw and which has yet been
only faintly traced by decisions of the courts.

. .

. It may be

assumed that Congress did not desire in any way to restrict a
State's participation in enterprises which might be useful in
extensively quoting Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. at 172, but not mentioning New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572).
See City of Bethel v. United States, 594 F.2d 1301, 1303 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).
45 See Michigan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817, 829 (6th Cir. 1994).
6 See id. at 836 (Guy, J., dissenting).

7 Id. at 834.
8 I.R.S. Gen.
49

id.

Couns. Mem. 14,407 (1935).
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carrying out those projects desirable from the standpoint of
the State Government which, on a broad consideration of the
question, may be the function of the sovereign to
conduct ...

50

Thus, the IRS ruled that the income produced by the Montana
Liquor Control Board was exempt from federal income tax, even if it
could be argued that selling liquor is purely proprietary. On the same
day, the IRS opined that the operation of liquor stores by the State of
Virginia was also exempt from income tax for the same reasons as
Montana.5 1 Several decades later, the IRS issued rulings that the
Oregon Liquor Control Commission52 and the Montana Liquor
Control Board53 are exempt from federal income tax. In neither case
did the IRS even mention the "essential governmental function" test of
section 115, which makes sense since in each case, the IRS acted on
the assumption that the operation of the Liquor Control Boards
constituted direct action by the State itself. Thus, none of these rulings
were about section 115's "essential governmental function"
requirement (or its precursor) because the IRS found that the States'
Liquor Control Boards were not separate entities from the state. 54
In 1977, however, the IRS did a curious thing. It ruled that the
income from an investment fund created by a State was exempt under
section 115. In doing so, it commented,
A comprehensive interpretation of section 115(1) of the Code
is set forth in G.C.M. 14,407 [the 1935 guidance about the
Montana Liquor Control Board] .

. .

. It was pointed out that it

may be assumed that Congress did not desire in any way to
restrict a State's participation in enterprises that might be
useful in carrying out those projects desirable from the
standpoint of the State government which, on a broad

Id.
I.T. 2886, 14-1 C.B. 103 (1935).
52 Rev. Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29.
53 Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 28.
54 Presumably, it would be improper to take the quote from G.C.M. 14,407 to
signal that the IRS understood the governmental/proprietary distinction to be
unworkable, since it determined on the same day that "when a State or political
subdivision engages in the operation of liquor stores it is acting in a proprietary
capacity land so] the compensation of employees [of such liquor stores] is subject to
Federal income tax." I.T. 2886, 14-1 C.B. 103 (1935).
50
51
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consideration of the question, may be the function of the
sovereign to conduct.55

As discussed above, the IRS's views of Congress's intent described in
G.C.M. 14,407 was meant to apply only to States themselves, and not
to those separate entities to which section 115 applied. But apparently,
at least by 1977, the IRS understood it to apply to section 115 as well,
because without any further analysis, it concluded that "[tihe
investment of funds by a State or political subdivision in an
investment fund of the kind involved in this case constitutes the
exercise of an essential governmental function for the purposes of
section 115(1) of the Code."5 6

Apparently, the IRS continues to apply this broad view of the
section 115 essential governmental function test - in effect, it has
imported the test that the IRS created for governments into
jurisprudence about separate entities created by governments. For
example, in Rev. Rul. 90-74, the IRS held that an entity that insured a
state's political subdivisions against casualties performed an essential
governmental function because "[plooling casualty risks through X
instead of purchasing commercial insurance fulfills the obligations of
the political subdivisions to protect their financial integrity....
Accordingly, X performs an essential governmental function."57 This
ruling expresses the IRS's view that "anything that makes or saves the
political subdivisions money serves an essential governmental
function." 8 Literally scores of private letter rulings support Professor
Aprill's characterization of the IRS's apparently very broad view of
what constitutes an essential governmental function. These private
letter rulings approve tax-exempt status for organizations that do
nothing more "essential" than promoting economic development,
among many other things. 59
Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45.
Id. Aprill has described the application of G.C.M. 14,407 to section 115 entities
as "both surprising and wrong." Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 437.
57 Rev. Rul. 90-74, 1990-2 C.B. 34.
58 Aprill, The Integral, supra note 10, at 816; see also Aprill, Excluding the Income,
supra note 10, at 429 ("The IRS, in contrast, has taken the concept of 'essential
governmental function' and expanded it until it encompasses any activity that makes
or saves money for a state or local government.").
59 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2015-15-016 (Apr. 10, 2015) (ruling that
"[p]roviding... health and welfare benefits [to retirees of a political subdivision]
constitutes the performance of an essential government function within the meaning
of IRC §115(1)"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2015-09-001 (Feb. 27, 2015) ("Providing for a
pooling of resources to procure F supplies and transmission services for municipalities
and their residents constitutes the performance of an essential governmental function
55

56
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Whatever the source of the IRS's broad view of what constitutes an
essential governmental function, it makes good sense for the IRS to
remove itself from the business of trying to identify which
governmental functions are essential and which are not. As Professor
Aprill points out, this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's
more modern approach to inter-jurisdictional tax immunity, an
approach that arose out of a real frustration with the difficulty of
developing a principled mechanism for distinguishing core
governmental functions from all the other things that states do.60 In
addition, Congress has had many years to clarify this area of law if it
wanted to narrow the circumstances in which a governmentallycreated entity could be exempt from tax. 6 1
The case that marijuana selling is an essential governmental
function, however, is stronger than merely the fact that it makes
money for the state. Rather, marijuana use has significant negative
health and social costs, and so the state's interest in controlling these
negative effects, especially among youth, is strong. 62 Just as it is with
liquor sales, it is well within the state's police power to seek to control
a market in dangerous substances.63 Protecting the public from the
negative effects of such substances is at the heart of what states do, as

within the meaning of IRC § 115(1)."); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-08-010 (Feb. 22,
2013) (holding that "[p]romoting economic development constitutes the performance
of an essential governmental function within the meaning of § 115(1)," and explicitly
citing the fact that Rev. Rul. 77-261 "stated that it may be assumed that Congress did
not desire in any way to restrict a state's participation in enterprises that might be
useful in carrying out projects that are desirable from the standpoint of a state
government and which are within the ambit of a sovereign properly to conduct");
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-20-024 (May 16, 2003) (ruling that "[b]y funding the
remediation of a contaminated and polluted site, [qualified settlement funds] perform
an essential governmental function"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-16-009 (Apr. 20,
2001) (ruling that a corporation whose purposes include "assisting the City in the
financing, acquisition, construction, and operation of a convention center hotel"
serves an "essential governmental function"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-53-008 (Oct. 1,
1987) (holding that a pooled insurance fund fulfills an essential governmental
function because it provides "coverage at a lower cost than could be obtained
commercially").
60 See Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 429.
61 See id. However, as Aprill also points out, the IRS's approach is unreasonably
broad according to the Code's plain language. There is little authoritative support for
the IRS's broad reading of "essential governmental function" to mean "any activity
that makes or saves money for the state." See id.
62 See, e.g., Pacula et al., supra note 15, at 1022 (citing a number of studies
showing adverse health effects of marijuana, especially for youths).
63 See LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER,
DUTY, RESTRAINT 50 (3d. ed. 2016).
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is evidenced by criminal laws as well as food and drug safety laws. 64

Governmental control of a market for potentially dangerous
substances also has a long history. For example, following Prohibition,
almost all of the states controlled alcohol sales either through
regulation or state monopoly. 65 In other words, the states have strong
governmental interests in citizens' health and safety that warrant state
control of marijuana markets. They are not merely making money.
Thus, even if the IRS's view of the "essential governmental function"
test were narrower than it appears to be, marijuana selling should
66
satisfy the test.

B.

Accrue to the Government

What it means for income to be "accruing to" a state or political
subdivision under section 115 is as confusing as what it means for the
state to be pursuing an "essential governmental function." Again,
courts have historically provided a relatively high bar, 67 while the IRS
has apparently lowered that bar dramatically in. its administrative
rulings. According to Aprill, the IRS's view, as expressed in these
administrative rulings, is that "[i]ncome accrues to the local
governments if those governments have an unrestricted right to
receive their proportionate share of the investment fund income." 68
64
65

See id. at4,8-10.
For further discussion on this topic, see

PHILIP J. COOK, PAYING THE TAB: THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ALCOHOL CONTROL 27-31 (2007), especially Table 2.4 on pages

30-31 showing the seventeen states that created a government monopoly on liquor
sales after the repeal of national prohibition; see also Harry G. Levine, The Birth of
American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite, and the Problem of Lawlessness,
12 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 63, 89, 94-95, 100-101 (1985).
66 Aprill's summary of the IRS's approach to section 115 generally has special
resonance in the marijuana context: "Understandably hesitant to tax state or local
governments without a clear congressional mandate, the IRS has reinterpreted
[section 115] to conform to its concept of what the law should be." Aprill, Excluding
the Income, supra note 10, at 429.
67 See id. at 440-42. Aprill discusses cases like Troy State University v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 493 (1974), Omaha Public Power District v. O'Malley, 232 F.2d
805 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 837 (1956), and City of Bethel v. United
States, 594 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979), which hold
that the state or political subdivision must have a present right (enforceable interest,
vested claim) to the entity's income for it to "accrue" within the meaning of the
statute. The fact that all the assets of the entity would be distributed to the political
subdivision on dissolution is not sufficient under this analysis.
68 Id. at 438. Elsewhere, Aprill characterized the IRS's position even more
permissively: "Income accrues to the political subdivisions if, upon dissolution, the
fund will distribute its assets to its members." Id. at 440.
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That characterization comes largely from the IRS's last revenue ruling
on the subject, which was issued in 1990. In that ruling, the IRS held
that income accrued to a state or political subdivision as long as "upon
dissolution, [the organization] will distribute its assets to its
members." 69
The IRS's approach has apparently not changed in the twenty-three
years since Aprill's first article on the topic. For example, in a private
letter ruling issued last year, the IRS concluded that a trust whose
purpose was to fund the costs of health and welfare benefits for a state
subdivision's retirees and their dependents met the "accruing to" test
because "[any assets remaining in [the] Trust after satisfying all
benefit obligations may be paid to [the political subdivision] to the
extent consistent with IRC § 115."70 There is no indication in any of
the scores of private letter rulings issued in the last several decades
that the IRS is applying a more stringent rule pertaining to the
"accruing to" test than the one Aprill described: so long as the assets
of the entity are paid to the political subdivision or subdivisions upon
dissolution or termination, then the "accruing to" test is satisfied. That
is, the entity meets the "accruing to" test, so long as it also meets the
requirement that it provide no substantial private benefit to any nongovernmental entities, as discussed below. 7
Under the IRS's test, then, it would be very easy for an independent
public development authority, like the one that operates the Cannabis
Corner, to meet the "accruing to" requirement of section 115. So long
as its organizational documents provide that all of its assets revert to
the town of North Bonneville upon its dissolution, it would qualify.
There would presumably be no requirement that it regularly pay its
profits over to the town, or that the town have any right to its profits
prior to dissolution. However, it would probably make more sense for
North Bonneville to structure the public development authority that
operates the Cannabis Corner in such a way as to make the profits
from the marijuana store available to the town in an ongoing and
predictable way. They could either require profits be transferred
according to some regular schedule, or they could structure the

69 Rev. Rul. 90-74, 1990-2 C.B. 34.
70 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2015-15-016 (Apr. 10, 2015); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2015-16-031 (Apr. 17, 2015) (very similar facts and analysis).
71 See Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 442-43 ("Through its
definition of accrue, the IRS has transformed the requirement in section 115 that
income 'accrue' to the political subdivision into prohibitions on private inurement and
private benefit identical to those applicable to charitable organizations exempt under
section 501(c)(3).").
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financials such that all funds (other than those required for day-to-day
operations) be deposited in a town-controlled fund. Presumably, the
development authority's relationship with its creditors and suppliers
would have a significant impact on whether it could transmit large
quantities of its revenue to the state treasury regularly or if instead it
would need to keep significant funds under its own control. 72 In any
case, it appears that the IRS's interpretation of the law gives the town
wide discretion to structure its financial relationship with its
development authorities in the way most conducive to its budgetary
needs without fear that their choices will result in taxable income.
C.

No Private Benefit

As discussed above, IRS guidance has added a requirement to
section 115 that does not appear in the statutory language. In the same
1990 Revenue Ruling that appeared to broaden the definition of
"accruing to" so dramatically, the IRS introduced another section 115
requirement: "no private interests participate in or benefit from the
operation of [the entity.]"7 3 In the ruling, the IRS discussed this
"private benefit" requirement in the middle of a paragraph in which it
assessed whether the entity performed an essential governmental
function. Immediately after the sentence about private benefit, the
ruling states, "[aiccordingly, [the entity] performs an essential
governmental function" implying that providing no substantial private
benefit is a requirement of meeting the essential governmental
function test.74 At other times, the IRS has simply stated that "even if
the income serves a public interest, the requirements of section 115
are not satisfied if the income also serves a private interest that is not
incidental to the public interest." 75 Professor Aprill argues that the IRS
has substituted a "destination of the funds" test for the traditional

72 Apparently, there is no agreement regarding the terms by which the Cannabis
Corner's profits are available to the town of North Bonneville. However, as of
February 23, 2016 at least, the Cannabis Corner has used all of its profits to cover its
internal obligations, including rent and repaying its debt burden. See E-mail from
John Spencer, Partner, Pulse Consulting, to author (Feb. 23, 2016, 12:30 PM) (on file
with author).
73 Rev. Rul. 90-74, supra note 69.

74 Id.
75 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (June 24, 1988) (holding that a corporation
created by a state to administer a college tuition prepayment program is not exempt
under section 115 because the individual participants in the prepayment program
receive a private benefit that is not incidental to the public purpose).
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essential governmental function and accrual tests, approving entities
under section 115 so long as they find no substantial private benefit.76
While Aprill expresses concern that the new private benefit standard
is an ad hoc IRS addition to the law and has no statutory authority,7 7
there is some validity to using it as a sort of substitute test for the
"essential governmental function" and the "accruing to" requirements.
By approving under section 115 any entity that does not provide
substantial private benefit to anyone other than political subdivisions,
the IRS avoids the difficult questions of what is an essential
governmental function and what it means for income to accrue to the
state. It leaves the maximum amount of discretion to the states and
their political subdivisions to conduct their affairs in the way that
makes the most sense to them, without completely ceding the field
and allowing states to engage in any kind of activity tax-free. If any
private person stands to gain from the income generated, then the
entity fails either the "essential government function" or the "accruing
to" requirements, and the income is not tax free.
The problem is that the parameters of the "private benefit" test are
currently horribly indeterminate.78 In the context of 501(c)(3)
organizations, the IRS generally applies both a "private inurement"
and a "private benefit" analysis, and the two concepts have legally
distinct meanings.79 Under a private inurement analysis, an
76

See Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 442.

77 See Aprill, The Integral, supra note 10, at 817 ("Use of this private benefit
standard is questionable..

.

. [Tihe IRS created out of thin air the . .. prohibition of

direct private benefit, that it claims applies under section 115. In applying the
principle it invented, the IRS usurped state sovereignty by substituting its own
judgment for the judgment of the state as to what is a public purpose."). It is worth
noting that this strategy of using the private benefit standard as a substitute for a
substantive governmental purpose requirement appears to be popular at the IRS right
now. On February 23, 2016, the Treasury promulgated proposed rules for the
definition of "political subdivision" in the context of tax-exempt bonds, and included
the following provision: "The determination of whether an entity serves a
governmental purpose is based on, among other things,. .. whether the entity
operates in a manner that provides a significant public benefit with no more than
incidental private benefit." Definition of Political Subdivision, 81 Fed. Reg. 8870, 8873
(proposed Feb. 23, 2016) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (emphasis added). This
use of the private benefit standard in the tax-exempt bond context also has no
statutory basis.
78 See, e.g., John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REv. 1063,
1064 (2006) ("Despite the IRS's broad invocation of private benefit as a policing tool,
however (or perhaps precisely because of its broad invocation of it), no one really can
define the doctrine." (emphasis added)).
79 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAw OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 20.12(a) (11th
ed. 2015) ("The private benefit doctrine differs from the private inurement doctrine in
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organization is unworthy of tax-exempt status if a private individual,
who is in a position to substantially influence the organization, also
stands to gain an excessive financial reward from the operation of the
organization.80 Both components must be present for a violation to
occur: the individual must be in a position to influence the
organization and she must receive an excessive benefit.8 1 For
marijuana stores like the Cannabis Corner, this could function as a
genuine restriction. For example, at least one report states that
Cannabis Corner's initial start-up capital came from "$260,000 in
high-interest loans it borrowed to get the store started." 82 A highinterest loan may or may not be an "excessive benefit" depending on
whether the risk-adjusted return is more than could be obtained by
unrelated persons in the capital markets. 83 That may be a difficult
question to answer. But the public development authority can avoid
trouble by making sure it borrows its high-interest loans from
someone who is not in a position to influence the organization. In
other words, as long as the lender is truly unrelated to the
development authority, then there is no risk of violating the private
inurement limitation.
The law regarding private benefit, however - as opposed to private
inurement - is much less defined, and there is no similar way for a
development authority to both take out high interest loans and ensure
that it is not violating the law.84 This is because courts have supported
the IRS's view that an organization could violate the private benefit
doctrine even if the benefited person is not an insider in the

two significant respects.").
80 See Benjamin M. Leff, Preventing Private Inurement in Tranched Social
Enterprises, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 25-27 (2015) [hereinafter Preventing Private
Inurement]. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 79, at § 20.1.
81 For some organizations exempt from tax under section 501(c), penalties can be
applied in these situations for so-called "excess benefit transactions." See I.R.C. § 4958
(2012). But these penalties do not apply to public development authorities or other
governmental affiliates, which are exempt from tax under section 115. See id.
§ 4958(e).
82 Frankel, supra note 1, at A4. In addition, Frankel reported that store manager
Robyn Legun "wanted to offer employees a steep discount" on the store's wares, which
could possibly also constitute a private benefit under certain circumstances. "In the end,

the board voted to offer the staff marijuana and bongs at a price just above cost." Id.
83 See, e.g., Leff, Preventing Private Inurement, supra note 80, at 33 ("[A] market
return is a function of risk, and a comparable rate cannot be identified without an
accurate assessment of risk in the venture" (citing Lowry Hosp. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 66
T.C. 850 (1976))).
84 See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 78, at 1064.
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organization.85 It is accepted that an organization may provide
incidental private benefits to private parties. It remains unresolved,
however, at what point a benefit ceases to be incidental and instead
becomes significant enough to violate the private benefit doctrine. 86
The IRS has consistently insisted that the question of whether private
benefits violate the doctrine is both a qualitative and a quantitative
test,87 so it is not clear whether the benefit has to be excessive, in the

sense of an above-market return. Although, the fact that a benefit
received by a private party is excessive would undoubtedly be relevant
to a private benefit analysis.
Given that selling marijuana is still illegal under federal law,
providing substantial start-up capital to a marijuana store presumably
poses some significant risk, and if the lenders assumed that risk, then
their interest rate might legitimately be quite high. Because of this, it
might be hard as a factual matter to determine if an interest rate is
excessive, since a relatively high rate may be justified. Even worse,
since the private benefit doctrine could be applied even when no
excessive benefit is conferred on private parties, there may be even
more uncertainty about whether a high-interest loan could constitute
an impermissible private benefit. Therefore, the private benefit
doctrine may well be a substantial impediment to the operation of
public development authorities that finance their operations with
private capital.
Because of the uncertainty in the law,88 a public development
authority selling marijuana could take the safest possible route by
raising all of its start-up capital from the state, rather than borrowing
from private investors, as the Cannabis Corner has done. There are
good reasons to think that this situation would be preferable from a

85 See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (1999)
(stating in dicta that "the dissipation of the charity's assets might ... support a finding
that the charity was conferring a private benefit, even if the contracting party did not
control, or exercise undue influence over, the charity"); Am. Campaign Acad. v.
Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1069 (1989) (recognizing that the private benefit doctrine
applies to "disinterested persons").
86 See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 79, at § 20.12(a) ("Although tax-exempt
charitable organizations may provide benefits to persons in their private capacity,
benefits of this nature must - to avoid jeopardizing exempt status - be incidental
both quantitatively and qualitatively in relation to the furthering of exempt
purposes.").
87 See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991); I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
88 As John Colombo has put it: "the problem is that the doctrine currently has no
theoretical grounding to set its outer boundaries." Colombo, supra note 78, at 1080.
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public policy perspective. In other words, in this case, the IRS's
concern with the line between a public entity operating for public
purposes and a public entity merely providing cover for private
persons seeking to make a profit may be at the heart of the difference
between a legitimately tax-exempt governmental entity and one that
should be taxable. If the organization uses exclusively public funds
(rather than investment funds from private investors), then any return
on the startup investment would "accrue to" the state or political
subdivision, and no "private benefit" - excessive or otherwise
would be available to investors. If the business uses private funds, then
there may be some question about both.89
In sum, it appears that a public development authority, like the
Cannabis Corner, could qualify for tax-exemption under section 115
rather easily. The Cannabis Corner itself may have not taken the most
conservative approach when it obtained its start-up capital in the form
of high-interest loans from private investors, but it may well have
satisfied the requirements of the private inurement and private benefit
doctrines anyway, in which case it presumably qualifies. More than
that, the requirements of section 115, even though they are much less
substantive than the text's plain meaning, provide some important
limitations that may well help government-controlled marijuana
sellers advance the public good.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY OR ILLEGALITY DOCTRINE

As discussed above, I wrote an article last year that argued that taxexempt 501(c)(4) organizations could sell marijuana, 90 but some
commentators were unpersuaded. 91 Most notably, the IRS continues to
argue that the so-called "public policy doctrine" (or illegality doctrine)
prevents all 501(c) organizations from being organized or operated for
illegal purposes or those that are contrary to a fundamental public
policy, which bars marijuana-selling organizations from exemption
under any section of 501(c).

92

However, the arguments for denying

89 On the other hand, the most reasonable interpretation of the law of private
benefit would permit a development authority to raise capital from private investors,

as long as the return on that investment was no greater than a market return.
90 See generally Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7.
91 See, e.g., Hackney, supra note 8, at 26.
92 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (Aug. 16, 2013) (ruling that an
organization that facilitated sales of marijuana could not qualify for tax exempt status
under § 501(c)(16) of the Code because, among other things, "if a § 501(c)(16)
organization commits illegal actions, or encourages others to commit illegal actions,
while performing its activities, it will not receive Congress' 'legislative grace' of

680

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:659

exemption under 501(c) for marijuana-selling organizations do not
apply to section 115. As far as I know, there is no authority that has
ever held that an entity created by a state or political subdivision to
advance an essential governmental function should be taxed on its
income because the pursuit of the essential governmental function is
contrary to federal law or fundamental public policy. More
importantly, the logic employed by the IRS in denying tax exemption
to private organizations that sell marijuana in violation of federal law
- whether that logic is derived from the common law of charities or
is founded on the general principle that exemptions be construed
narrowly against taxpayers - simply does not apply to organizations
created by governments.
In the context of tax-exempt organizations, the public policy
doctrine is derived from the law of charitable trusts. Under English
common law, "the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or
violate established public policy."93 The IRS has taken the position
that an organization that sells marijuana cannot qualify for tax-exempt
status under section 501(c)(3) because its activities are illegal under
federal law. 94 While the illegality doctrine has almost exclusively been
applied to charitable organizations, it has also occasionally been
applied to other organizations that are exempt from tax under other
sections of 501(c) of the Code.9 5 But the IRS has recently issued nonprecedential guidance that quite clearly indicates that it believes all tax
exemptions are subject to the illegality doctrine, and therefore an
organization that sells marijuana in violation of federal law cannot
qualify for tax exempt status under any section of the Code. 96
Therefore, it is worth discussing in detail why the reasoning of this
guidance is wrong. In a section entitled "Illegality," the ruling begins

exemption from federal income tax"). See generally Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7, at
550-58.
93 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
94 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-24-036 (June 15, 2012).
95 See Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7, at 552. Although, it is important to point
out that no court has ever expressly held that the public policy or illegality doctrine
applies to any classification of tax-exempt organizations other than section 501(c)(3)
organizations.
96 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (Aug. 16, 2013). It is important to note
that a private letter ruling is not even the official expressed policy of the IRS, and a
taxpayer (other than the taxpayer to whom it is directed) cannot cite it as support for
her position. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (2012). Nonetheless, because it is the most
recent and most explicit discussion of the IRS's views on the application of the
illegality doctrine to non-charitable exempt organizations, it is worth discussing in
some detail.
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by explaining that "exemptions are not a right, but a matter of
legislative grace." 97 It then argues,
"This general and well-established principle is not limited to
exemptions for charitable organizations, but applies to all
deductions and exemptions from federal tax. Congress did not
intend to provide tax deductions and exemptions to activities
that are illegal."98
The case it cites as authority for this statement is Green v.
Connally.99 In Green v. Connally, the District Court of the District of
Columbia upheld an IRS ruling denying tax-exempt status under
section 501(c)(3) to a private school that discriminated on the basis of
race. The Supreme Court later decided this issue consistent with Green
in Bob Jones University v. Commissioner.00 The IRS cites Green (a
district court case) rather than Bob Jones (a Supreme Court case) in
this instance because the Green court included a discussion of the
existence of a general public policy doctrine that applies to all
exemptions and deductions under the tax code in addition to the
specific public policy doctrine that derives from charitable trust law
and therefore applies only to section 501(c)(3) organizations. The
Supreme Court did not include a similar discussion in Bob Jones.
The Green court described a "general and well-established principle
that the Congressional intent in providing tax deductions and
exemptions is not construed to be applicable to activities that are
either illegal or contrary to public policy."' 0 The court then went on
to cite no less than four Supreme Court opinions for that proposition,
each of which discussed the principle that no deduction may be taken
by a business if the expenditure that gave rise to the deduction
violated some law or fundamental policy.1 02 But, as the students in my

97

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (Aug. 16, 2013).

98 Id.

99 Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
100 Bob Jones Univ. v. Comm'r, 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983).

101 Green, 330 F. Supp. at 1161.
102 Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966) (permitting a deduction for cost of

hiring a lawyer to represent a broker in his criminal securities fraud case); Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958) (denying deduction for fines paid
to state); Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (permitting a deduction for rent and
wages paid by proprietors of an illegal gambling operation, even though paying those
expenses was a crime under state law); Lilly v. Comm'r, 343 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1952)
(permitting a deduction for fees paid by eyeglass makers to doctors for prescribing
eyeglasses).
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introductory Federal Income Tax class know,1 03 subsequent to these
four Supreme Court cases, Congress acted in 1969 to codify those
situations in which deductions can be denied under the so-called
public policy doctrine. 0 4 The legislative history accompanying the
1969 codification makes it clear that it was intended to be an exclusive
list of expenses that failed to qualify on account of public policy.
Indeed, the Joint Committee's "Bluebook" stated, "[p] ublic policy, in
other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to
justify the disallowance of deductions."10 Furthermore, the Treasury
Department issued regulations, binding on the IRS, that state
unambiguously, "[a] deduction for an expense ...
which would
be
denied
on the
otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall not
grounds that allowance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply
defined public policy." 0 6
In other words, the general, free-standing public policy doctrine
discussed in the cases cited in Green simply does not exist anymore. It
is no longer accurate to state that, "[tihis general and well-established
principle is not limited to exemptions for charitable organizations, but
applies to all deductions and exemptions from federal tax." 07 The
public policy doctrine does still exist with regard to the exemptions
and deductions that apply to charitable organizations. 0 8 But it does
not apply in other situations, other than those expressly described in
the Code. 109 In other words, there is no public policy or illegality

103 See MICHAEL

J.

GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 231 (7th

ed. 2013).

104 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 487, 710 (1969).
105

STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 91sT CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 234 (Comm. Print 1970).
106 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1(a) (2016).
107 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-33-014 (May 20, 2013).
108 See, e.g., Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7, at 550-51.
109 Some commentators have pointed out that some courts have held that the
"frustration of public policy doctrine" still applies to deny the deduction of business
losses under section 165 of the Code if such losses arise out of illegal activities, even
in the absence of a statutory warrant for such denial. See Douglas A. Kahn & Howard
Bromberg, Provisions Denying a Deduction for Illegal Expenses and Expenses of an Illegal
Business Should Be Repealed, 18 FLA. TAX REv. 207, 209, 212-13, 232 (2016)
(discussing Stephens v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.
1990); Holmes Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 114 (1977)). However, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear in its reversal of the Tax Court in Stephens v.
Commissioner that the denial of a deduction for illegal business losses under Section
165 only applies when such losses are equivalent to a fine or penalty, the deduction of
which would be statutorily prohibited under Section 162(f). See Stephens v. Comm'r,
905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We believe that the public policy considerations
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doctrine that would prevent the income from an organization that
otherwise met the requirements of section 115 from being exempt
from federal income tax.
III.

BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED MARIJUANA STORES

The previous sections have argued that an independent government
authority that operated a marijuana store would be exempt from
federal tax. In this section, I argue that permitting such an exemption
is sound public policy. The IRS's exempt organizations division is ill
equipped to be the front line arbiter in the inter-jurisdictional clash
between federal and state marijuana policies. But, perhaps ironically,
the existence of section 280E, coupled with an exemption for qualified
sellers, could support state efforts to provide responsible access to
marijuana without completely unleashing a free commercial market.
Last year, I argued that permitting 501(c)(4) organizations to sell
marijuana tax-free is not only right under the law, but good policy.110
But that argument is even stronger when applied to governmentowned stores. The introduction of a market for marijuana has
significant social risks. Citizens are concerned that the legal sale of
marijuana (whether only for medical purposes or more widely) may
pose risks to purchasers, especially to underage purchasers."' Local
governments may be in a better position than for-profit sellers to
operate marijuana stores consistent with the public welfare, and
several commentators,
including some participants in this
symposium,11

2

have

advocated

that at least

some states should

experiment with a government monopoly on marijuana sales." 3

embodied in Section 162(f) are highly relevant in determining whether the
payment ... was deductible under Section 165."). In other words, there is no support
for the IRS's claim that a free-standing public policy doctrine "applies to all deductions
and exemptions from federal tax."
110 See Leff, Tax Planning, supra note 7, at 527.
M11 See Pacula, et al., supra note 15, at 1022 ("[W]e have presented the public
health perspective favoring certain types of regulations in light of documented harms
associated with marijuana use, particularly for youths.").
112 See generally Richard J. Bonnie, Professor of Med. and Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of
Law, Keynote Address at the UC Davis Law Review Symposium: Disjointed
Regulation, State Efforts to Legalize Marijuana (Jan. 29, 2016). [Ed. Note: An
annotated version of this keynote was published as Richard J. Bonnie, Keynote, The
Surprising Collapse of Marijuana Prohibition: What Now?, 50 UC DAvis L. REV. 573
(2016).]
113 See Pat Oglesby, States May Be Stuck With Second-Best MarijuanaTaxes, 72 ST. TAX
NOTEs 539, 539 (2014) [hereinafter States May Be Stuck] ("The safest, correctable way to
distribute an intoxicant is government monopoly.. . . "); German Lopez, Big Marijuana
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Recognizing the tax-exempt status of these government-owned stores
permits (and even encourages) a state policy of governmental
dominance over the marijuana market that arguably advances both
state and federal policy objectives.
Furthermore, constructing a viable state tax regime is especially
difficult in the case of marijuana, as Pat Oglesby and others have ably
pointed out. 114 In all states, marijuana is currently sold on wellestablished black markets. When a state legalizes marijuana, one of its
primary goals is to move the marijuana market from the existing
illegal (and untaxed) market to its new legal (and taxed) market.1 15 If
it sets its taxes too high, especially initially, it runs the risk of
preventing the legal market from driving marijuana consumers away
from their existing illegal suppliers.11 6 On the other hand, economists
predict that once a legal supply chain is developed for legal marijuana,
the "wholesale" price may fall dramatically.11 7 A state may have an
interest in preventing this dramatic price drop from affecting the retail
price, since low retail prices may drive growth in demand for
marijuana. The popularity of legalization among some voters depends
Is Coming - and Even Legalization Supporters Are Worried, Vox (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2015/12/2/9831980/marijuana-legalizationindustry-business ("Drug policy experts have long argued that the best approach to
legalizing marijuana is a restrained policy - one that limits access to cannabis by, for
instance, putting state governments directly in charge . . . .").
114 See Pat Oglesby, Gangs, Ganjapreneurs, or Government: Marijuana Revenue Up
for Grabs, 66 ST. TAX NOTES 255, 255-56 (2012); Pat Oglesby, Laws to Tax Marijuana
(How to Tax It), 59 ST. TAX NOTES 251, 258 (2011); Oglesby, States May Be Stuck, supra
note 113, at 541-43; see also JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION:
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNow 259 (2d ed. 2016); RAND REPORT, supra note 15, at
53; CHRISTOPHER LAW, CTR. FOR NEw REVENUE, LEGALIZED RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA
AND BLACK-MARKET CHALLENGE: EARLY LESSONS FOR FUTURE POT LAws 5-6 (2015),
https://newtax.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/legalized-recreational-marijuana-and-theblack-market-challenge.pdf; MACCOUN ET AL., supra note 15, at 44-55.
115 See, e.g., Oglesby, States May Be Stuck, supra note 113, at 539 ("Any marijuana
legalization model . . . must use either low prices or enforcement to solve the problem
of bootlegging - selling by the illegal sector.").
116 The challenge of setting state taxes low enough that legal retail prices are not
too high is exacerbated by the uncertainty of the operation of federal income taxes due
to section 280E. The evidence that we have so far from early adopters of legal
marijuana regimes is that the existence of state taxes at current levels are not
preventing a robust legal marijuana market from developing alongside the established
illegal one. See, e.g., Tanya Basu, Colorado Raised More Tax Revenue from Marijuana
than from Alcohol, TIME (Sept. 16, 2015), http://time.com/4037604/coloradomarijuana-tax-revenue/.
117 See Oglesby, States May Be Stuck, supra note 113, at 539 ("After marijuana is
legalized, the costs of producing and selling it will collapse and windfall economic
gain will be up for grabs.").
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on a belief that legalization will not lead to dramatic growth in
demand, since most people still view marijuana as having some
adverse medical or social effects.1S Thus, a state may hope to prevent

the retail price of marijuana from falling too dramatically by taxing the
sale of marijuana to keep the price stable.
It is difficult to design a state tax system that could accurately identify
the right level of taxation - low enough to ensure that the regulated
market can compete with the black market but high enough to
discourage growth in demand as prices fall. It is even more difficult
because changes to the wholesale price of marijuana are likely to be
dramatic, and are unusually hard to predict. Designing a state tax
system that is sufficiently dynamic to take into account such changes as
they occur is arguably impossible.11 9 But, if a state simply set the price
of marijuana, which it would do if its legalization regime created a state
monopoly on marijuana sales, it would be extremely easy to react
quickly to changes in the wholesale cost of marijuana to keep prices at
an optimal level to meet the state's multiple regulatory purposes.
Perhaps ironically, one benefit of a state monopoly on marijuana
sales is that it would reduce the chance that there would be a private
(but state supported) monopoly (or oligopoly) on marijuana sales.
Voters in Ohio recently rejected a legalization initiative because it
"would have created an oligopoly on marijuana production for a small
handful of the initiative's wealthy donors."1 20 While the Ohio Initiative
was an extreme case, marijuana legalization advocates and public
health experts alike have expressed concern about the effects of big
businesses entering the marijuana market,121 and some believe that
strict licensing regimes potentially create governmentally-supported
windfall profits for politically-connected sellers.1 22 A state monopoly

118 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON & E.J. DIONNE, BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW POLITICS
OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHY OPINION Is CHANGING 3 (2013), https://www.

brookings.edu/research/the-new-politics-of-marijuana-legalization-why-opinion-ischanging/ ("Many of those who favor legalization do so despite believing that
marijuana is harmful or reporting that they feel uncomfortable with its use.").
119 There may even be constitutional issues. See Nima H. Mohebbi, Samuel T.
Greenberg & Ian S. Speir, Crafting a ConstitutionalMarijuana Tax, 69 TAX LAw. 214,
215 (2015).
120 Christopher Ingraham, Why Ohio Voted Against Legal Marijuanaand What It
Means for the Future of the Pot Debate, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/03/ohio-rejected-legalizing-marijuanawhat-that-means-for-the-future-of-pot/.
121 See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 113.
122 See, e.g., RAND REPORT, supra note 15, at 96 ("Like any licensing plan, any quota
system transfers scarcity rents from the state to quota owners.").

686

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 50:659

prevents such windfall profits. In the case of a monopoly operated by a
public development authority or authorities, the IRS's rules against
"private benefit" 123 supplement any existing protections against private
excess profits from selling marijuana.
One objection I have heard to the operation of marijuana stores by
state development authorities (that also applies to high taxes on
marijuana) is that some voters are skeptical that new revenue raised
from a legal marijuana industry would be wasted by state or local
governments. An even stronger argument has been made that there are
significant adverse effects when governments come to rely on revenue
from so-called "sin" taxes.1 24 In other contexts, states' claims about the
uses of "earmarked" government revenue to address social or health
issues have turned out to be empty promises.1 25 High marijuana taxes
have also been criticized for being "regressive," meaning that poorer
people pay a higher percentage of them, relative to their income, than
richer people.1 26 This is true even if there is no difference in the
amount of marijuana consumed by poorer or richer people, since an
identical tax on the same amount of cost is borne more heavily by a
poorer person than a richer one simply because the same tax makes up
a larger proportion of a poorer person's income.
A governmental marijuana monopoly would function something
like high marijuana taxes, since it would enable the state or local
government to "sop up" potential profits as the cost of marijuana
production falls. One solution to both of these problems would be for
a state that legalized marijuana under a government-monopoly system
to distribute all or some of the profits from the operation of the
marijuana industry to the citizens of that state or locality. Creating a
public development authority to operate the government monopoly

123 See supra text accompanying note 73.
124 Andrew J. Haile, Sin Taxes: When the State Becomes the Sinner, 82 TEMP. L. REV.
1041, 1043 (2009) ("[R]eliance on sin taxes comes with a troubling ethical issue:
when a state becomes dependent on sin tax revenues to finance essential
governmental programs and services, the state creates a conflict of interest between
the protection of its citizens' health and the need for continued sales of harmful
products.").
125 See, e.g., GosTIN & WILEY, supra note 63, at 263 ("[The Master Settlement
Agreement] offered a missed opportunity for investment in smoking prevention.
Unfortunately, the states have used the discretionary funds primarily for general
education, social programs, tax relief, and other political priorities. States are spending
less than two cents of every dollar in tobacco revenue from the MSA and tobacco taxes
to fight tobacco use. Meanwhile, for every dollar spent by states to reduce tobacco use,
the industry spends eighteen dollars to market tobacco products.").
126 Haile, supra note 124, at 1050-51.
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would make it easier to mandate the terms of a profit distribution
system, since the same legislation that created the authority could also
stipulate the mechanism by which its profits are distributed to the
people. Because of the requirement that the profits "accrue to" the
state or political subdivision, it would probably be unwise to distribute
all of the profits, but a substantial percentage would no doubt be
permissible. And the class of distribution recipients could be defined
broadly enough that the "private benefit" doctrine would not apply.
For example, each citizen of the jurisdiction could receive an equal
distribution (which would mitigate the regressivity of the tax). Or,
profits could be distributed progressively, with a larger distribution
being made to poorer citizens. Or, profits could be distributed as
"reparations" primarily to people in communities that were most
adversely affected by marijuana prohibition policies and the war on
drugs. Under any of these systems, the concerns that marijuana taxes
are regressive or will be used inefficiently by the government are
unwarranted.
CONCLUSION

At first blush, the idea that government-owned marijuana sellers
could be exempt from federal tax because they advance an "essential
governmental function" seems like the perfect test of Professor Ellen
Aprill's claim that "[ulnder [the IRS's section 115 policy] governments
could conduct tax-free any kind of enterprise for any reason." 2 7 But
the case for government-controlled marijuana sellers is actually much
stronger than it initially appears. If the federal government is looking
for a way to avoid the kind of inter-jurisdictional conflict that is
currently being caused by the contradictory state and federal laws
about marijuana,1 28 a federal tax incentive for local governments to
control their own retail marijuana markets may be extremely
beneficial. Recognizing the tax-exempt status of independent public
development authorities that sell marijuana, when combined with the
harsh tax treatment of commercial marijuana sellers under IRC §280E,
creates exactly such an incentive. And it is already the law.
From the state perspective, it may also appear that directly operating
an industry that is illegal under federal law, even if operated through
independent public authorities, will provoke inter-jurisdictional
conflict. However, if a state monopoly on marijuana sales is the most
Aprill, Excluding the Income, supra note 10, at 439.
128 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin,
Cooperative Federalismand MarijuanaRegulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015).
127
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responsible way to operate a legal marijuana industry, even if only for
a transitional period, then it is a means for navigating the interjurisdictional conflict in a way that is the least destructive to national
interests.
One place where a state monopoly may be especially well suited is
my home of Washington, D.C. We legalized recreational marijuana by
initiative in 2015, but Congress blocked us from implementing a
regulatory system by placing a rider on our budget, preventing the
D.C. government from spending any money to implement the
legalization law.1 29 Because we have so many close neighbors that have
not legalized recreational marijuana (Virginia, Maryland, and federal
land), it is especially important for our transition to legalization take
place in a controlled manner. A D.C. governmental monopoly on
marijuana sales would be the easiest mechanism to ensure this level of
control. In this city, where African-American communities were so
hard hit by the negative effects of decades of marijuana prohibition,130
it might make sense to treat the distribution of governmental
marijuana profits as reparations for those decades of harm. For D.C. to
lead the nation in both sane marijuana legalization policy and
reparative racial justice would be especially fitting.

129 See Aaron C. Davis, Budget Bill Outlaws Pot Sales in D.C. for 2 Years, WASH. POST
(June 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/dc-politics/house-budget-billwould-outlaw-marijuana-sales-in-dc-for-two-years/2015/06/1 1/ffd763ae-1051-1 1e5adec-e82f8395c032_story.html.

130

See generally, DONALD

BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND

FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (providing information about the dramatically
adverse and wide-ranging impacts of high levels of incarceration on families in DC,
only some of which are due to marijuana prohibition).

